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 “The US-led liberal order – global management of change through coercion and elite 
incorporation, not an embrace of diversity or equality” 
Abstract 
This article argues that the biggest challenges facing the post-1945 liberal international order 
are to genuinely embrace ethno-racial diversity and strategies to reduce class-based 
inequalities. However, this is problematic because the LIO’s core foundational principles, and 
principal underpinning “theory” (liberal internationalism), are Eurocentric, elitist, and 
resistant to change. Those core principles are subliminally racialized, elitist, and imperial, and 
embedded in post-1945 international institutions, elite mindsets, and in American foreign 
policy establishment institutions seeking to incorporate emerging powers’ elites, willingly, 
into the US-led order. As illustration, this article considers examples that bookend the US-led 
system: wartime elite planning for global leadership, and the role of the UN in Korea, 1945-
53, which served as the primary instrument for the creation and incorporation of (South) 
Korea into the US-led order; and the role of several US-state-linked initiatives in China over 
the past several decades, including the Ford Foundation. The article compares the 
contemporary and historical evidence to liberal internationalists’ claims, and those implied by 
the work on “ultra-imperialism” by Karl Kautsky and Antonio Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony. 
The article concludes that elite incorporation – by a combination of coercion, attraction, and 
socialisation – is the principal goal of the US-led order, not embracing diversity and moving 
towards genuine change felt at a mass level. Hence, we should expect domestic and 
international political crises to deepen. 
 
Introduction 
It is widely agreed that the US-led liberal international order is at the very least in transition if 
not in crisis.
1
 This article raises a number of significant questions to clarify the current 
                                                          
1
 Emerging powers are demanding renegotiation of power within the international system, there are strong 
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conjuncture in the US-led liberal international order (LIO), particularly the academic ‘theory’ 
(liberal internationalism) that underpins the system. The most significant question addressed 
is: Is liberal internationalism a legitimating ideology more than it is a description or 
theoretical explanation of the existing system? I explore that question by considering several 
specific sub-questions, the net effect of which is to provide pathways to address the main 
issue: how did we get here? Who built the order? What were the foundational principles in 
theory and practice? How has the international order’s leadership managed change within it 
since 1945? 
I address these questions by considering detailed examples of actual practice by US and allied 
elite leadership groups at key moments – first in conceptualising and building the order both 
in WWII and immediate postwar years by exploring the creation of the South Korean state; 
and secondly by looking at the management of change and challenges – in particular the 
(re)emergence of China as a great power. Both cases are claimed by leading liberal 
internationalists to be primary examples of the successes of the LIO: hence, examining those 
cases in some detail, allows us to compare liberal internationalist rationales – which were 
also the stated aims of policymakers – with historical and contemporary evidence.  
The overall finding is that liberal-internationalist thinking/theory is, in effect, a 
(unconsciously on the part of its proponents) legitimating ideology rather than an effective 
explanatory frame for understanding the way in which the LIO actually works. That 
conclusion is reached, in part, by suggesting the applicability of a rather different perspective 
on the operations of the LIO and US power, in particular, as better understood in a 
synthesised Gramscian-Kautskyian framework, explained below.  
The import is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist, hegemony – strongly imbued with explicit 
and implicit racial and colonial-imperial assumptions - in domestic and foreign relations. At 
home, it helps partly explain the phenomenon of the ‘left-behind’ white working/middle 
class, and its economic- and status-anxious affluent voters whose salience on the Right has 
transformed US politics since the Reagan revolution.
2
 Responding to the (minorities’) rights 
revolution of the 1960s and the loss of economic opportunity and lowering living standards 
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2
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due to technological change and global redistribution of industry,
3
 white working and middle 
class voters drifted towards the Republican party of low taxes and fiscal conservatism.
4
 This 
delivered little in material terms and, as inequality increased with market-freedom and 
stagnant real wages, ‘rust belt’ and other workers grew increasingly dissatisfied with the 
status quo of establishment politics, exacerbated by anxieties about ethno-racial diversity and 
American identity as the US moves towards a ‘majority-minority’ society in which whites are 
a minority.
5
 This resulted in 2016 in the election of Donald Trump on an overtly anti-
conservative, and barely concealed, white identity platform at home and programme of 
protectionism and non-interventionism - America First – abroad.6  
Yet, political dissatisfaction or disaffection was not confined to the political Right.
7
 Occupy 
Wall Street movements and groups also vented their anger at the inequalities of power, 
wealth and income, particularly in the wake of the Iraq war and of the 2008 financial crisis.
8
 
In external policy, it helps explain the difficulties, perhaps the impossibility, in readily 
embracing a more diverse international order as well as the character of that very embrace.
9
 
Accepting nations of the global south on an equal footing may become a strategic necessity 
but the process remains problematic given the racialized discourses of western power over 
the past several centuries, in the US fortified by the experience of the slave trade, slavery, Jim 
Crow, orientalist views of Asians, and others.
10
 Class power helps explain the strategic 
embrace of foreign elites as the sources of change and the agents of American influence, 
however diluted it may have been due to national interest considerations. Those on the apex 
of America’s vertical hierarchies sought to ally with and incorporate their foreign elite 
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counterparts, with their full cooperation, in Korea and China.
11
  Hence, the liberal 
internationalist Korean and Chinese successes must be qualified by considering the 
inequalities wrought by developing market-oriented societies marked by economic inequality, 
rising social unrest and varying degrees of political repression. Hence, in successful China 
and Korea, and India and other emerging powers, there remain major challenges underpinned 
by great power, wealth and income inequalities, the politics of which is frequently class-
based but also heavily racialised and xenophobic.
12
 
Why choose Korea and China as key cases? Although these are very different states, varying 
in global significance, and analysed at different periods of historical time, they do allow us to 
test out important claims made by liberal internationalists. Korea is considered as a key test at 
the very birth of the US-led order – at a time when we could expect the new principles 
embodied at the UN such as the rule of law, lessons of Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes’ 
trials, of the Geneva conventions and the rights of civilians in combat zones, etc.. to be most 
likely to be attempted if not fully achieved. Given the fervour of anti-colonialism, and US 
claims to champion that cause, we could expect the behaviour of the international system’s 
leading power to differ sharply from that of colonial rulers in what became known as the 
Third World. Korea tells us a great deal about the practical application of a new international 
system developed by US power within an international system of rules, applicable to 
hegemon and others alike, a key liberal internationalist claim. 
China’s integration into the US-led international system from the late 1970s also tells us a 
great deal about the character of the international order, especially about how significant 
change is managed within it and what the embrace of diversity means in practical terms. By 
the 1970s, the US-led order was facing challenges, of course, from West Germany and Japan, 
for example, the oil-producing states, not to mention the G77 demands for a new international 
economic order, and also recovering from the defeat in Vietnam and the legitimacy crisis 
following the Watergate scandal. For liberal internationalists, the integration of China is 
claimed to be a success story for the liberal order and China. Yet, without denying the 
dramatic increase in economic power, I question the character of China’s success given the 
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high levels of turmoil within China as well as the very high levels of inequality there which is 
the source of major political and economic instability. China then is a test of the claim that 
the liberal order rewards societies as a whole whereas a Gramscian-Kautskyian counter 
argument would suggest that it is largely the Chinese ruling elite and its business allies who 
have been accommodated in the US-led international system, not the mass of ordinary 
Chinese.  
Liberal Internationalism: theory, ideology, practice 
Liberal internationalism is an ambiguous, multifaceted approach to understanding, 
explaining, justifying and practicing international politics. One aspect of it is as a positive 
theory taught in academic international relations, derived from liberalism, as applied to 
international affairs, explaining how the foreign policies of leading states, especially the 
United States and Britain, work. It is also a normative world-view, used by some of its 
proponents to indicate what the world ought to look like and how it might, and frequently 
does, work. Liberal internationalism, therefore, is also a set of policies and institutions, 
established practices.
13
 
 
As an IR theory liberalism has key pillars – liberal societies are characterised by limited 
government, individual freedom, private property, pluralism and tolerance, progress, 
institutions and cooperation for peace, interdependence. As a theory of US foreign policy, 
which is the object of analysis here, this theory encompasses democratic values, economic 
interdependence, international institutions as a framework for cooperation in addressing 
global crises and problems and broadly promoting the general welfare. Emerging historically 
from the era of rising anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, with the United States and 
Britain in the lead, the US-led order laid claims to being opposed to colonial rule, for national 
and human rights, for a system of international power undergirded by rules binding hegemon 
and others alike. It was not promoted as a continuation of empire by other means but a new 
system based on universalistic principles applicable to all regardless of race, colour or 
history. 
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For my immediate purposes, it is unnecessary to disentangle the positive from the normative, 
the theoretical from the practical because this framework of thought derives both from deep 
principles but also as a set of solutions to international problems, especially world wars. 
Hence, liberal internationalism is frequently referred to as Wilsonianism – after Woodrow 
Wilson’s internationalist programme that included formation of the League of Nations after 
World War I, the forerunner of the longer-lasting post-1945 United Nations system. 
 
As a theory, I argue here that it operates as ideological legitimation even when its proponents 
offer reform; it justifies the status quo. In that regard it differs little overall from other 
theories like Marxism, for example, or Realism. But because it is the principal system of 
ideas and practices, and ideals, that are used to explain, implement and defend the present 
international status quo, I would suggest that it elides too much to be fully validated, beyond 
the company of its proponents. Of course, it explains aspects of the world’s functioning but 
its interpretation tends to be benign: crises and challenges are explained as resolvable within 
the system’s governing principles through socialisation, integration, assimilation.  
 
So I use it as an amalgam to suggest that, while it is all of the above, upon reflection it serves 
within academia and in IR as a positive theory of how things actually are - i.e. as the opposite 
of ideology. It lays claim to explaining the world even if its adherents are also normative 
supporters of the theory. I show it is actually ideological because it elides key factors of how 
the liberal world order actually works and that other theories suggest better ways to explain 
the world. 
 
In the next section of the article, I analyse in more depth and more critically liberal 
internationalist ideas and claims with a view to identifying key elements of a more viable 
framework to explain the LIO – a critical theory influenced by the work of Antonio Gramsci 
and to some extent synthesized with the work of Karl Kautsky. Offered below, however, is a 
brief outline of a novel approach to understanding the LIO as the principal aim of this article 
is to identify the weaknesses of liberal internationalism in practice with a view to opening 
space for subsequent theorizing. In sum, what appears missing in liberal internationalism are 
domestic power inequalities – class and race-based, for example – and broad attachment to 
(democratic) elitism, and a hierarchical approach to other powers, especially in the global 
south. 
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While Wilsonian liberal internationalism privileges a belief in the free movement of people, 
capital, goods and services, less well-known is its origins – at a time when ‘international 
relations’ was overtly understood as ‘race relations’ and therefore became embroiled in 
managing overtly-racialised imperial power after WWI.
14
  The Wilson administration’s role 
in racially-segregating the federal government had its foreign policy counterpart in a belief in 
a far-off eventual self-government of the colonies and opposition to a Japanese proposal for a 
racial equality clause in the fledgling League of Nations charter.
15
 The development of liberal 
internationalism, then, was symbiotically-bound to the necessity of Wilson’s intervention in 
world affairs and the institutions of both the federal executive and developing private 
institutions that were effectively para-state organisations, such as Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, among others. Wilsoniam ‘theory’ was practical, idealistic, and 
ideological from the very beginning. It is also the case that, long after overt racial discourses 
became politically-damaging, subliminal racial thinking remained, and (unconsciously) 
remains, significant to liberal internationalism and affects its analyses of the politics of 
domestic and global demographic power-shifts.
16
  
Nevertheless, liberal internationalists are cosmopolitans – opposed to narrow nationalism and 
trade protectionism, within a US-led international system. But its core ideas – rule of law, 
superiority of the western idea (however lightly worn), a rules-based institutional order open 
to all, in principle,  are deeply embedded in US political-intellectual elite think tanks, 
university public policy schools, corporate media and the leaderships of both main political 
parties,
17
 the core of the white Anglo-Saxon protestant establishment.
18
 Importantly, 
however, there are influential voices in the emerging powers and regions that support the 
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liberal international order by calling for internal reform to take account of the changing 
distribution of global power away from the west and towards the ‘rest’.19   
The upshot is a broad consensus around certain core ideas: that the post-1945 rules-based 
world order, whatever its weaknesses, serves the world well by spreading prosperity and 
maintaining peace. Though it cannot continue unreformed, that US-led system draws on deep 
resources – economic, military, systemic, and ‘soft’ – that bestow upon it continuing 
strengths to contain, engage, manage, and socialize emerging powers. Charles Kupchan lists a 
range of problems requiring US leadership even if only within a suitably reformed 
international system reflecting “the real distribution of power”.20    
Princeton’s John Ikenberry, this school’s leading proponent, makes significant claims as well 
as displaying several taken-for-granted assumptions, undeveloped allusions to core powers’ 
violent and other connections with the periphery, and a number of significant silences. He 
claims, for example that the US is a fully-functioning democracy yet fails to acknowledge 
evidence of the power of racialised, class-based elites. For critical theorists, such as Robert 
Cox, Stephen Gill, and Craig Murphy,
21
 the international relations of elites across states and 
societies operate to reproduce extant patterns of power and manage or engineer change to the 
benefit of elites in a generally zero-sum game in which broad masses and lower classes lose 
out. This is clearly a far cry from liberal internationalist claims associated with the benefits of 
globalization even if ameliorative remedies for the harshest effects are proposed. Likewise, 
claims about the centrality of the rule of law occludes consideration of significant violations 
in practice. The question of imperial power is hardly addressed and there is a general 
Eurocentric neglect of the significance of global areas beyond the core to the ‘welfare’ and 
cohesion of the core itself.  There is a clear link between Ikenberry’s overt theory of 
American democracy and its liberal-hegemonic world role. The United States, and the 
Western order it built, is characterized as a pluralistic, liberal, market democracy that is 
broadly inclusive, and tolerant of ethnic diversity. The US-built security community exhibits 
its leading state’s internal character – plural and, very significantly, one in which the US is 
                                                          
19
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bound by rules.
22
 Yet, liberal internationalists’ underlying assumptions effectively deny the 
findings of numerous well researched studies challenging American democracy’s principal 
claims.
23
  
The western idea is a significant part of the strength of the US-led order as far as Ikenberry 
and Deudney, and many others, are concerned.
24
 The West, a spectacularly successful 
“civilizational heritage”, was underpinned by America’s New Deal liberalism, extended 
globally via Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and NATO. In effect, this vision and 
programme aimed to defuse domestic class conflict and the threat of war through “activist 
government, political democracy, and international alliance.” That system is in principle 
capable of assimilating emerging powers due to the universalism of its values and tolerance 
of ethnic differences, although others joining this privileged grouping should conform to its 
rules and accept US leadership. Western order is exclusive also because special rules apply 
within its zone of peace. Beyond it, conversely, other rules apply – cruder, neo-imperial and 
violent, although the implications of this are left unaddressed.
25
 By drawing a line around the 
West, Ikenberry cuts off the rest of the world while addressing questions about the sources of 
world order which, empirically, lie in a symbiotic relationship between core and periphery. 
Yet, even within the ‘greater’ West, Japan and S. Korea were not accorded the same 
treatment as Western Europe.
26
 It really was conceived and developed as a system of the west 
and the rest, in a zero sum game. As EU Co-President Tusk noted in a May 2017 tweet – the 
whole point of “euro-atlanticism” was to “prevent post-west world order”.27   
Yet, the claim persists that this is no empire despite America’s privileged place at the top of 
the “hierarchical political order”, because its hegemony is built on “consent” and bounded by 
law. Power, which was necessary at the creation, faded away as consensual hegemony 
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(summer) 2002, pp.575-607. 
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developed. This elides, of course, America’s overwhelming military superiority including in 
and over Europe. Beyond Europe, however, Ikenberry concedes that American hegemony 
remained hierarchical, “with much fainter liberal characteristics”,28 again closing an 
analytical and empirical avenue that threatens the intellectual edifice of the LIO. 
Ikenberry’s Eurocentrism’s (unconscious) racialised world view is subtly buttressed by 
Walter Russell Mead’s exploration of the significance of superior Anglo-Saxons who win 
wars, build world structures, and govern efficiently due to ethno-cultural, not biological, 
characteristics. Mead’s interpretation of Anglo-Saxonism makes it appear benign, 
assimilative, and universal
29
 – scaffolding for Ikenberry’s more overtly institutional analysis.   
Assimilating minorities, however, is not embracing diversity – learning from other cultures 
and creating something new; it is maintaining conformity to the cultures of the powerful, 
dominant group.
30
 Going forward, as new global powers emerge, Mead advises America to 
both embrace and contain them, retaining military superiority should ‘rising’ powers become 
“opponents”.31 Mead complements other liberal-realist internationalists’ prescriptions - 
incorporate, assimilate, mobilise emerging powers to absorb difference and produce 
conformity. 
The liberal view is challenged by scholars who argue that the New Deal order effectively 
represented a political compromise for class peace and greater productivity that mainly 
benefitted major corporations while incorporating organised labour and thereby defanging it. 
The postwar settlement was a narrow one – excluding racial minorities, unskilled and 
unorganised labour, and women – and relied on war and a heavily militarised economy that 
arose with the Korean War and led directly to the Vietnam war.
32
 Liberal internationalists’ 
accounts elide the class, gendered and racial bases of the order – at home and abroad. 
Ikenberry paints an appealing picture of a liberal order that delivered material benefits and 
security to all yet also casts some doubt on the system itself, especially in regard to the 
inequality of rewards generated by globalisation, and what might be the political 
consequences. The latter are regarded by Ikenberry as the greatest threats to the stability of 
the liberal order, laying bare a central mechanism and dynamic of the system itself –market-
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driven class inequality exacerbated in a society in which racialized-class politics is salient.
33
 
Yet, Ikenberry never mentions class, race or gender, an omission central to critical theories of 
the making of the liberal international order.
34
 
The other key omission is the role of war and violence in order-building – not just World War 
II but Korea, for example, the ‘hot’ war at the birth of the order that propelled the formation 
of NATO, rearmament of Germany, the Japan security alliance, not to mention the US 
military-industrial complex.
35
 Hence, a key case considered here is wartime planning for a 
new world order as well as the manner of its foundation as a direct result of military violence 
that violated the UN Charter, international law, the lessons of the Nuremburg and Tokyo war 
crimes trials, and the 1949 Geneva conventions. Wars ‘out there’ secured the core ‘over 
here’.36 
And, of course, what is referred to as benign ‘liberal internationalism’ is what Mark Mazower 
refers to as “imperial internationalism” – trying to maintain global hierarchy established by 
centuries of colonial and semi-colonial rule over what is now called the global south.
37
 
Finally, the construction of the post-war Western order was constitutive of a political-social-
economic-ideological “vital center”, (opposed to Right wing nationalists and Left wing anti-
imperialists) as Schlesinger terms it
38
 – the acceptance by core forces of the ‘New Deal order’ 
that the price of class harmony, stability and mobility at home required the export and 
continuation of inequality,
39
 and therefore military violence, on the periphery: the removal of 
vast quantities of raw materials required a global military basing strategy both to protect 
allied trade and deny it to adversaries.
40
 Ikenberry accurately notes that the internal character 
of the leading state in the liberal order impacts on the international system it built – but I 
diverge from his presentation of this as the externalisation of a democratic regime. He elides 
the racial, class, and gendered character of American historical, economic and political 
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development – including of Wilsonianism itself.41 His conclusion, however, is also accurate 
even if Ikenberry fails to recognise its significance to liberal order building and maintenance: 
“Access to resources and markets, socioeconomic stability, political pluralism, and American 
security interests – all were inextricably linked…”42 
The framework that may best fit the actual underlying locomotive of liberal order-building 
and maintenance, however, must also incorporate understanding of the ‘soft’ processes of 
socialisation or incorporation. Violence is a powerful tool but always and everywhere it is 
connected with the processes of non-violent elite socialisation and alliance building. It is one 
of the great strengths of Ikenberry’s analysis of international order that elite socialisation is 
considered so significant.
43
 
Yet, a critical view of elite socialisation in hegemony-building and perpetuation views it as 
incorporation/domestication into hegemonic agendas and not a reflection of a democratic and 
benign foreign policy.
44
 In the Gramscian perspective, capitalist great powers, including the 
USA, are deeply unequal at home and imperialistic abroad, ultimately pursuing the interests 
of their ruling classes and elites, whether embedded in private, public or state-private 
realms.
45
 Their hegemony is a combination of persuasion and coercion involving a ‘state-
society complex’.46  Admittedly, liberalism has an account of elite socialisation processes, 
which overlaps with Gramscian approaches. However, liberal approaches see it as relatively 
benign, politically-neutral or representative of democracy/popular sovereignty. 
My critical approach connects Gramscian thinking with a forgotten early twentieth-century 
socialist theoretician of “ultraimperialism” – Karl Kautsky. According to Kautsky, in contrast 
to Lenin’s claim of the inevitability of inter-imperial wars of hegemony, ultra-imperialism – 
the tendency of national ruling classes to form international class-based alliances to jointly 
exploit the world’s resources47 - leads to cooperation rather than conflict between capitalist 
states. Kautsky notes that inter-capitalist corporate/state cooperation could take numerous 
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forms – such as cartel-like agreements or even the formation of a “league of states.”48 Of 
course, there is a strong tradition of critical thinking by neo-Gramscians – Cox, Gill, but also 
other Marxists such as Kees van der Pijl
49
 – that extends to the building of transnational 
alliances. That work, however, largely focuses on cold war era US-Western European 
alliances in a junior partnership with the United States. In this article, I consider two Asian 
states – South Korea and China – the political-cultural incorporation of which would clearly 
differ from the Euro-American example. On the other hand, all incorporation processes come 
up against strictly national interests and specific cultural differences including in the British 
case; hence the controversies over naval armaments in the 1920s, over the terms of the 
alliance after 1945, refusal by Prime minister Harold Wilson to support the US with troops in 
Vietnam and, later, frictions over the Falklands war.
50
 The attempt at incorporating any 
power, great or small, is extremely difficult.  
Kautsky is forgotten largely because his claim – which essentially suggested there would be 
no major war between capitalist great powers - was spectacularly disproved by the outbreak 
of the First World War.
51
 However, clearly there are numerous alliances and international 
agreements that uphold Kautsky’s approach. The European Union, for example, is a case in 
point – a supranational alliance among several great and smaller powers with a colonial past 
– which has effectively prevented war between them and generated enduring cooperation 
over decades. Stokes argues that American power, via the liberal international order with its 
panoply of multilateral organisations, perfectly exemplifies ultraimperialism given its system-
maintenance role serving a range of other states – much to President Donald Trump’s pluto-
populist chagrin.
52
 Kautsky’s ultraimperialism was hardly a utopia free of rivalries and wars, 
however, given the levels of exploitation and subordination endemic in capitalist international 
relations.
53
 Yet, even critics argue that Kautsky’s idea is more applicable to the post-1945 era 
of liberal international order, underpinned by US hegemony and an influential web of 
institutions that embed western powers – NATO, IMF, World Bank, G7, among others. 
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Indeed, since 1989 it could be argued that ultraimperialism spans virtually the world,
54
 
although I argue that in the case of China, the process began in the late 1970s. Of course, 
Kautsky is clear that the pattern of international capitalist alliances is subject to change along 
with the uneven development of power and economy. Therefore, we would expect tensions 
within the system of relationships, despite shared interests, placing great strain on institutions 
amid muscle-flexing among certain states that feel unduly constrained by the international 
system. Hence, the current tensions between the Trump administration, China, Germany, the 
EU, NATO, for example. Whether this represents the breakdown of the post-1945 order or its 
recalibration remains to be seen.  
Kautsky is therefore useful in our understanding of the liberal international order in two 
ways: first, to suggest that war, despite other tensions, is not inevitable between great powers, 
but for reasons rather different from those suggested by liberal internationalism’s egalitarian 
and benign ideas about interdependence; and secondly, that great powers, aiming to jointly 
promote their power against others at home or abroad, build alliances with their elite foreign 
counterparts where they already hold power or, by extension, where such a nascent elite 
might be fostered. Such is the case in the Korean and China instances discussed below though 
in neither case is there any suggestion that one state controls another – it is that their ruling 
elites hold shared interests even if that means their enrichment at the expense of the broad 
mass of their own people. This challenges Leninist,
55
 Realist and liberal conceptions of the 
international order – the system is imperial but not necessarily doomed to perpetual war, and 
neither is it benignly liberal. This is international ‘high’ (class) politics – cooperation for 
shared narrow self-interest but resting on unstable social and political foundations.  
Wartime planning for a postwar US-led order 
Ikenberry’s benign interpretation of the US-led order is read back into the 1939-45 activities 
of elite planners of the postwar order. Developing the “Grand Area” concept, State 
Department and Council on Foreign Relations planners identified the world zones the US 
“required” without having radically to reform its economy, an area encompassing practically 
the whole world.
56
 The key point elided is that it was to cohere that imperial ‘grand area’ that 
so much of the institutional architecture of Western power was built – the IMF and World 
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Bank, United Nations, as well as the Marshall Plan, GATT, and NATO;
57
 and the inter-
relations between the grand area’s regions were never envisaged as being in any sense equal 
– but with flows of raw materials towards Western reconstruction and social peace, and 
finished industrial goods in the other. The postwar settlement at home that coalesced, as 
Hogan argues,
58
 around hi-tech capital intensive industries, international finance, and 
organised skilled labour, was located within an international settlement that secured broad 
corporate interests under the auspices of an interventionist state. And, in that regard, the 
United States’ military capacity to police flows of goods across the world was at the very 
least a part of the reason that the United States acquired “forward bases in Asia and 
Europe”.59 As policy-makers such as Henry Stimson and John J. McCloy noted: American 
and Western well-being relied on “‘open markets, access to raw materials, and the 
rehabilitation of much –if not all – of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines’”.60  
CFR and State Department wartime planning therefore was driven above all by a vision of 
US elite global-imperial leadership, strongly supported by Britain’s ruling elites, via an 
international order of organisations and relationships.
61
 In concert with Britain’s elites, the 
aim was to resurrect European great powers including by restoring shattered colonial trading, 
economic and financial linkages. Indeed, the Marshall Plan viewed European reconstruction 
in that global context.
62
 The UN was envisaged as a key international agency for American 
imperial-internationalism, at least in its earliest days,
63
 and as its role in the making of South 
Korea shows, it remains the official basis of America’s role in that country today. Finally, the 
building of a hegemonic multilateral order indicates the significance of a Gramsci-
Kautskyian synthesis. 
The United Nations and Korea 
The manner of America’s division, military occupation, founding of and war for the Republic 
of Korea is highly instructive as to the character of the new world order that the superpower 
sought to build and of its actual conduct as opposed to publicly-stated claims. Observable 
                                                          
57
 L. Shoup and W. Minter, Imperial Brain Trust (New York: Monthly Review, 1977). 
58
 M.J. Hogan, “Corporatism: a positive appraisal,” Diplomatic History 10 (10) 4, 1986; pp.363-372. 
59
 M. Leffler, ‘The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48,’ 
The American Historical Review 89 (2) April 1984. 
60
 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, p.174. 
61
 Inderjeet Parmar, Special Interests, the State and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-1945 (London: Frank 
Cass, 1995); Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004). 
62
 Parmar, Foundations, p.151. 
63
 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. 
16 
 
behaviour fell far short of the tenets of the rule of law, human rights, the rights of civilians, 
and the due process of national and international law. The building and consolidation of a 
Korean ruling elite and its admittedly narrow but important civil societal base – critical 
friends/friendly critics – undermines liberal explanations and supports the Gramsci-
Kautskyian perspective. 
The United States, shortly after detonating two atomic bombs over Japan in August 1945, 
divided the Korean peninsula at the 38
th
 parallel, with the Soviet Union offered the northern 
sector and the US the southern. At that time, the Soviet Union chose not to take control of the 
entire peninsula despite American forces’ unreadiness to effect an occupation. Upon 
occupying southern Korea, however, the US declared it ‘semi-hostile’ territory and applied 
military law, using Japanese-colonial laws and police methods, reinforcing the National 
Police and bringing in the extreme right-wing, anti-communist Syngman Rhee, who had been 
absent from the country for decades, as putative leader to head the fight against the popularly-
established Peoples Committees that had declared a provisional government.
64
 
 
In brief, popular uprisings for an independent unified Korean government led to massive 
repression even before the outbreak of the (civil) war. 100,000 people were killed in the 
violence up to June 1950 when the war broke out. Thereafter, the United States, operating 
even before the UN had passed a security council resolution authorising military action, 
waged a military campaign against North Korea of rare ferocity. Obliteration or saturation 
bombing led to millions of deaths. The American mission in Korea was formally represented 
under the banner of the UN but the UN had little or no voice in the ‘police action’.65 
 
The creation of South Korea as a separate independent state resulted from extreme external 
US pressure on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) which was authorised 
to hold national elections in the whole of Korea (i.e., north and south) by the United 
Nations.
66
 The US effectively forced UNTCOK to go ahead with elections in the south 
against the will of the majority of people in the south, apart from Syngman Rhee’s 
conservative party and the National Police, the two most extreme right-wing organisations in 
southern Korea. All other organisations from across the political-ideological spectrum – 
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labour organisations, farmers, women, students, youth, etc… - had opposed elections on the 
basis that right-wing violence had made free and fair elections a virtual impossibility. Hence, 
the declaration of UNTCOK that elections were fairly held in south Korea was used as a 
pretext by the US in the UN to win recognition of the ROK as a sovereign state. UNTCOK 
had observed a mere 2% of polling stations during the 1948 elections.
67
 It was after that the 
north declared itself a sovereign state as the DPRK. The very creation of South Korea then 
was a violation of agreements at the UN and between the US and Soviet Union, and other 
agreements.
68
  
American military violence has been characterised as ‘military orientalism’ (Barkawi and 
Stanski 2012),
69
 racist attitudes about the character of Koreans and Chinese, their general 
inferiority.
70
 According to Bruce Cumings, Anglo-American atrocities ran up to 6:1 higher 
than those carried out by North Korean and Chinese troops.
71
 Reginald Thompson, the Daily 
Telegraph correspondent in Korea, noted that US marines considered Koreans apes, not 
humans, and rained death on them on an unprecedented scale. It was machines versus men, 
warfare reminiscent of colonial-era wars, with liberal use of napalm, obliteration bombing by 
B-52s, that inflicted “holocausts of death”, eliminating distinctions between combatants and 
civilians.
72
 
 
General MacArthur ordered relentless bombing to create “ ‘a wilderness of scorched earth...’” 
North Korea was carpet bombed for 3 years, with 635,000 tons of bombs dropped (half that 
dropped on Germany in WWII, and more than in the entire Pacific theatre, 1941-45); and 
32,000 tons of napalm. Massive casualties resulted - leading to between 2.5-4 million Korean 
deaths; 900,000-1 million Chinese; 54,000 US; and nearly 700 UK deaths.
73
 Almost from the 
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very beginning of the War, Truman and MacArthur threatened atomic warfare.
74
 MacArthur 
advocated dropping twenty small atomic bombs across Korea to create a no-man’s land 
between South Korea and China. There was a general belief that Asians were weak and could 
not possibly stand up to hi-tech, relentless American firepower; but also a feeling of 
humiliation among military and civilian leaders that the weakest ‘communist satellite’ – 
North Korea – was beating the US. US military operations cost around $70 billion. A small 
largely rural country saw between 40-90% of all urban areas destroyed; even after just a few 
months, North Korea had no targets of any worth to bomb.
75
 
 
Military orientalism prolonged the war and increased casualties.
76
 It also created the main 
barrier to ending hostilities by preventing an agreement on the return of prisoners of war. As 
this was defined as a war between races and cultures as much as between freedom and 
slavery, barbarism and the rule of law, there was a desire from Truman and military 
commanders on the ground to make Asians pay for their resistance.
77
  Hence, in violation of 
the Geneva Conventions on compulsory and swift return of enemy prisoners of war, the 
Anglo-Americans demanded all prisoners be ‘screened’ to see if they wished to return to 
North Korea or China, prolonging the war.
78
 The veil of ‘voluntary repatriation’ allowed the 
torture and punishment of Chinese and North Koreans in prison camps run by Syngman Rhee 
and KMT forces, leading to thousands of killings, as reported by numerous press agencies, 
the International Commission of the Red Cross, and British, Canadian and US troops who 
had policed the PoW camps.
79
 Anglo-American allegations of torture of Western troops in 
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Chinese and North Korean camps were undermined by later US army studies of released US 
PoWs who reported generally good treatment rather than torture.
80
    
 
After the cease-fire of 1953, the US helped build a repressive state with consistently high 
levels of military and economic aid that sustained a dictatorial regime headed by Rhee until 
his overthrow by popular rebellion in 1960. Simultaneously, but at a highly restricted level in 
contrast to aid for police and military institutions, training, arms, etc…, was laid the social 
basis of a narrow elite democracy, or at least a ‘liberal’ leadership – a modernising elite - 
sector in a para-statist civil society (state-sanctioned/approved/permitted), working within the 
system – friendly critics or critical friends of the regime.81 In effect, this was an elite that was 
fostered for a period in the future when repression and dictatorship became unsustainable in a 
radical-nationalist populace with leftist tendencies and a desire to reunify the country. Indeed, 
by the 1980s, as popular unrest grew, US strategy shifted towards ‘democracy promotion’ 
(actually, the initial move in this direction began with the end of the Vietnam War) as the 
basis of ‘stability’.82 
 
Yet, up to the 1970s, South Korea remained economically backward while North Korea 
outsripped it in terms of economic growth and living standards. The Vietnam War changed 
the equation significantly. In return for the deployment of a cumulative total of 300,000 
troops, South Korea received without-strings aid of billions of dollars from 1965-1973. It was 
the massive boost from war contracts and to consumer goods production for export that South 
Korea’s economy grew and raised living standards and, indirectly, fed the demand for 
political freedoms. War, therefore, played a fundamental role in the making and remaking of 
modern Korea.
83
 
 
However, in the only book-length analysis of the US role in building ‘civil society’ and South 
Korean ‘democracy’, Brazinsky argues that, despite decades-long support for an unpopular 
repressive regime, the US would have preferred to build democracy but for the intervention 
of the cold war and therefore the Soviet threat. A stable alliance took precedence over 
democracy. Brazinsky separates US support for repression from support for Korean civil 
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society construction, the making of the social basis for attenuated democracy, a liberal social 
sector. In line with liberalism/liberal internationalism, Brazinsky fails to appreciate the 
combined/complex character of regime-formation, in which there are roles for both coercion 
and consent, violence and reform, exclusion and inclusion.  
 
In addition, Brazinsky either ignores, misses, or misunderstands the role of race and racism as 
isolated incidents beyond the essential fabric of American attitudes, or within dominant 
liberal thinking. Yet, evidence indicates race and racism as fundamental both to the 
construction of American society, economy and polity, and its foreign policy.
84
 Koreans were 
viewed as a backward people, dependent, requiring massive cultural transformation to ready 
them for modernity and civilisation, as semi-humans whose lives were cheap.
85
 Such attitudes 
were embedded within the military leadership as well as in Asian studies programmes that 
were funded to comprehend “the Asian mind” in readiness for America’s civilising mission. 
General Douglas MacArthur believed that Asians understood only one thing –  violence; and 
that the Pacific Ocean was an “Anglo-Saxon lake”.86 
 
In this respect, MacArthur, President Truman, and secretary of state Dean Acheson, among 
others, expressed essentially the outlook lauded as superior by Mead in God and Gold (2007) 
in which he celebrates the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons in those very terms – as builders 
of peace, the global conditions for capitalism, the international institutions of order. 
Modernisation theory, the secular distillation of this creed in the cold war, demanded an elite 
and elite networks for moulding leadership and strategies for western-style economic and 
political development. Although Brazinsky examines numerous initiatives to modernise 
Korea and build a civilian elite to lead it, he fails to see its exclusive, statist and elitist 
character or to comprehend the linkage of repression of radicals with the processes of elite 
socialisation in ‘civil society’ programmes.  Given this, more research is required to critically 
examine the historical record. Yet, the Gramsci-Kautsky synthesis may provide a better 
explanation of elite-elite relations in postwar order-building and the fostering of a Korean 
ruling elite and a broadly supportive civil society sector. 
 
The Challenge of China  
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Research on the role of China studies and other programmes, on the other hand, in the long-
term shift towards the gradual integration of China into the US-led order is more advanced.
87
 
It permits understanding of the ways in which US hegemony operated especially at a time of 
relative weakness – in the wake of the Vietnam War, the OPEC crisis, and demands for a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) from the global south. In effect, China was prised 
away, quite willingly after Mao, from its revolutionary role in world politics, along with 
several other so-called middle class global south nations – such as India, Brazil, Mexico, 
Turkey, among others – via loans and investments and incorporated into the dominant order 
to the point where China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the 1990s. NIEO 
demands, in effect, were gutted by a strategy of divide and rule and partial incorporation.
88
 
The key point, however, is that what appeared to be a solution to a problem in the 1970s 
planted the seeds of later political-economic (and related legitimacy) problems most 
significantly in accelerating the process of deindustrialisation in the United States,
89
 the drift 
of white working and middle classes to the subliminally-racialised and gendered messages of 
the Republican party in the wake of the 1960s ‘rights revolution’ – the construction of the 
“angry white male”90 that helped Ronald Reagan to office and aided the rightward shift of the 
GOP and the sharpening of partisan politics. It is the disappointment with the mainstream 
GOP leadership that Donald Trump harnessed to win the presidency in 2016 on a message 
that overtly challenged the US-led international order.
91
 Trump’s approach also appears to 
threaten the carefully-crafted Sino-US relationship.
92
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Liberal arguments reject Realist predictions of inevitable military conflict between ‘rising’ 
and ‘declining’ powers and suggest that Sino-US conflict is avoidable through dual strategies 
of “containment” through security alliances – of which the US has many and China only one, 
with North Korea – and integration through a variety of means including diplomatic, 
commercial, and other.
93
 Basically, the strategy seemed to be one of making China another 
pillar of the US-led order, although not so powerful as to be a threat to the hegemon.
94
 Yet 
again, liberal approaches elide the hierarchical and unequal character of Chinese society and 
in practice commend elite-to-elite cooperation to largely maintain an apparently stable but 
unequal system. But the hegemony in China of the Party-state and other elites attached to a 
growing private market-oriented sector, is almost inherently unstable due to massive change 
wrought by industrialisation, urbanisation and mass migration.
95
 It is perhaps unsurprising 
then that Chinese elites proactively sought assistance from foreign, especially American 
agencies, to learn about the world and to help manage China’s transformation into a more 
outward looking state, society and economy. After all, the United States had spawned the 
modern corporate foundation, and concomitant extensions of federal and state powers 
precisely in lockstep with its own transformations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and elite visions of eventual global leadership.
96
 
 
A Gramscian-Kautskyian approach perhaps better aligns or echoes what President Xi Jinping 
argued is “a new type of great power relationship” between the US and China.97 This strongly 
suggests that there are both push and pull factors in the relationship of the two great powers 
and therefore many shared interests at the regional and global levels. It is too early to argue 
that the two economies are truly interdependent, as equals, but it is clear that there are many 
linkages and bi-directional co-dependencies. China’s ownership of US debt and dollars, its 
role after the 2008 financial meltdown to assist recovery, American direct investment in 
China, the sheer numbers of students criss-crossing the Pacific, reliance on each other’s 
export markets – and a shared interest in cooperation on nuclear tensions over North and 
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South Korea – all indicate high levels of shared interests.98 Add to this the increasing number 
of American foundations, think tanks, university branches and scholarly and other exchanges, 
there is a depth to their interaction over several decades after the death of Mao that appears 
durable and lasting.
99
  
 
At the core of the relationship of the two powers appear to be powerful elite knowledge 
networks, closely aligned with their respective states, which facilitated the rapprochement 
after Mao, and helped to effect transformational change in key areas of Chinese society. In 
particular, the development of so-called market socialism was certainly assisted by American 
economists teaching in China, the development of US-trained Chinese PhDs returning and 
establishing university programmes in ‘modern economics’ that focused on market relations 
and the price mechanism, and by think tanks within and of the party-state.
100
 Economic 
reform was not spontaneous but well organised and led from the top, even if progress is not 
linear, reflecting uncertainties and political opposition to the westernisation of China, 
especially among the ‘new left’.101 Yet, the direction of travel and the distance already 
travelled is clear – and in part became clearer when President Xi stepped forward at the 
World Economic Forum at Davos in 2017 and declared that China would defend and promote 
globalisation should President Trump’s America ‘retreat’ from its hegemonic role.102 Similar 
declarations were made following President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States 
from the Paris Climate Accord.
103
 
 
The United States has a record of exporting economists and transplantation of economic 
thinking and ideas to transform states, although China is a qualitatively different ‘project’ 
when compared with the impact of the ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile and the so-called ‘Beautiful 
Berkeley Boys’ in Indonesia.104 The latter were relatively weak, dependent states in contrast 
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to China.
105
 The willingness of Chinese party elites to invite American (and other foreign) 
ideas and methods, duly adapted, is the key point here though. China sought transformative 
ideas, training and strategies and has transformed its economy as a result and its dependence 
on the global market and US-rules based system that enabled that transformation.
106
  
 
Ford Foundation investments in China yielded major dividends through students and scholars 
who had studied modern economics abroad. In particular, the “Ford class” programme of 
exchange masters and doctoral research – led by influential economists like Lawrence Klein, 
Princeton’s Gregory Chow and others, graduated over 500 students in micro and 
macroeconomics, econometrics, development economics, international finance and so on.
107
 
Ford’s grants helped China’s think tanks gain access to relevant experience and expertise 
through collaborative  research and training  in  applied economics, helping to build 
independent policy research institutes like the China Center for Economic Research and the 
China Center for Agricultural Policy, combining the best internationally-trained Chinese 
analysts with domestic scholars. The entire complex of programmes was designed to "build a 
field" and, once successful, Ford support focused on specific policy research projects and 
institutions that expanded other on-going Foundation work in China.
108
  
 
Equally interesting, even if change in this sector appears slower than in the economy, are the 
initiatives by US agencies to build ‘civil society’ in China, with funding running to over five 
hundred million dollars from, among others, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. Since 
2002, a further $400 million has been invested from US sources into civil society 
programmes. Derided by critics as the building of ‘government-organised non-governmental 
organisations’ (Gongos), the more important point is to strengthen stability by experimentally 
releasing the tight grip of overstretched state institutions – local, regional and national – 
behind a programme of Small Government, Big Society.
109
 The point is to help the state 
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better manage social and political change not build an actual fully-functioning independent 
civil society. And in that regard there are at least some interesting similarities with United 
States’ historical development. In the US, state-building private elite organisations promoted 
the formation of official state agencies and departments at federal level to manage a rapidly 
changing and increasingly complex society with few nationally-oriented institutions, as 
opposed to locally-oriented ones, reflecting parochialism.
110
 Collectively, the nascent federal 
agencies and their state-oriented private elites effectively constituted the new American state 
of the twentieth century, nourished by war and economic crisis and emerging as a superpower 
after World War II. China’s fundamental problem is managing change with an overstretched 
state – and using the banner of Small Government, Big Society to release new energies to be 
harnessed to the stability project. American foundations have been vital to this programme, 
hence the criticism. Yet, the Gramsci-Kautsky formulation serves to explain this project well. 
 
The activities in the United States of various private organizations interested in China, such 
as the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China, and 
within China itself, were effectively authorised by successive American administrations.
111
 
They were formally “independent of the government and yet operated with its support”, 
including with the CIA and other agencies. In effect, China’s stable development is an 
American vital interest – or at least it was assumed to be until the advent of President 
Trump’s (rhetorically) disruptive administration. The above activities, then, constituted a 
process of broadening the basis of China’s state legitimacy, funded to the tune of hundreds of 
millions of dollars from mainly private American sources. According to Spires, over 95% of 
all Ford Foundation funds for civil society building went to Chinese state-licensed 
organisations.
112
  
 
The “new type of great power relationship” is being tested by the (rhetorically) unpredictable 
and transactional approach to global politics of the Trump administration.
113
 Although we 
have already seen disruption of the atmospherics of liberal hegemonic culture, President 
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Trump remains under pressure to retain the international security structures of the US-led 
order as well as its international trading regimes, even if the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement has been rejected, although several presidential candidates in 2016, including 
Hillary Clinton, had been opposed to it. A correction, in other words, was politically-viable. 
It remains to be seen however if Trump’s economic nationalism, as further indicated by 
apparent withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, merely recalibrates the system or is a 
fundamental rejection of it. Up to now, it looks more like the former than the latter but only 
due to the virtually unremitting pressure from establishment figures within and beyond the 
administration.
114
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The foundational values, interests and institutions of the (Anglo) US-liberal international 
order, with due respect for important but not fundamental recalibrations and corrections along 
the way, are the sources of its current crises or at least challenges. Hierarchical, imperial and 
racio-civilisational thinking constitute the LIO’s leaders’ mentalities and power structures 
even if those are normally subliminally-embedded as to be unconscious deep structures 
themselves.
115
 The American White Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment (Wasp) built and 
maintained the liberal order, in a ‘competitively-cooperative’ alliance with their British 
counterparts
116
 whose imperial and racial mentalities were hardly in conflict with their 
American cousins.
117
 Whatever changes occurred or were forced on US elites over time, 
those underlying and mainly-subliminal values remained significant in decision-making, 
including when nurturing new states and powers like South Korea and China. 
Hence, liberal internationalism as a ‘theory’ or approach to world order, as it elides and skirts 
matters of hierarchy, race, and class, as it does in its outline understandings of American 
democracy, misses a critical part of the picture, of the dynamics of international power as 
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well as the dynamics of domestic power. Because of that elision, the failure to see, I suggest 
it is a legitimating ideology of the American ruling elite. I argue above that the LIO is better 
understood as a system of hierarchy, inequality, and as what Persaud calls ‘racio-
civilizational’. What does that mean? It means that this system and its leaders cannot yet 
comprehend an order that encompasses on the basis of something approaching equality the 
broad mass of people – citizens – at home let alone the non-western peoples of the global 
south, or even their elites. That tweet from Donald Tusk is revealing and instructive because 
it was addressed to President Trump in simple and stark terms: “Euro-atlanticism means the 
free world cooperating to prevent post-west world order” – so, please “do not touch”. 
International alliances of elites, including with those from the emerging powers like China, 
are in large part attempts to manage and channel change to prevent radical power shifts, to 
manage world order that serves in starkly unequal ways elites and masses, in west and east. A 
Gramscian-Kautskyian synthesis combines consideration of domestic and international class-
based imperial hegemonies and may explain the order better. However, it also offers a way 
out, in theory, and provides ways to assess the likelihood of avenues towards egalitarianism 
being taken by ruling elites. The prognosis is not positive at this point although the bases of 
ways forward appear to be coming into view as political strife, electoral shocks challenge the 
status quo.
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